We apply a generic procedure developed by Harrison, Horridge and Pearson (1999) to decompose the economic implications of the Kyoto Protocol at the cross-country level. The total economic impact for each region is split into contributions from its own emission abatement policy and those from other regions. Our analysis, which is based on a large-scale computable general equilibrium model for the world economy, indicates that spillover effects are an important consequence of multilateral carbon abatement policies. Emission mitigation by individual developed regions may not only significantly affect economic development and performance in non-abating developing countries, but may also cause large changes in the economic costs of emission abatement for other industrialized regions. Analyzing the individual contributions across policy measures of abating countries, abatement on behalf of the United States produces by far the largest spillovers to other countries. Major competitors such as Europe and Japan benefit significantly from abatement in the United States, whereas the United States, in turn, is hardly affected by abatement policies of these regions. We calculate a cross-country matrix for monetary transfer payments which would have to be assigned on a bilateral basis in order to provide compensation for the Kyoto spillovers. We show that the contributions of individual policy changes to the overall effect depend on the policy instrument. When we simply change from a price instrument (taxes) to a quantity instrument (emission permits) in order to meet the Kyoto commitments, the quantitative decomposition results change. However, the qualitative results remain robust suggesting that the decomposition procedure provides a useful starting point for bilateral negotiations on policy-relevant transfer payments across parties of the Framework Convention.
Introduction
Under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries and economies in transition (Annex B countries), have committed themselves to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels in the period 2008 to 2012. Developing countries have argued that they carry only minor historical responsibility for the increase in global CO 2 concentrations and therefore have refused any abatement commitment so far. At first glance, abstinence from domestic action seems to insure the developing countries against potential costs from greenhouse gas abatement because their economic development will not be constrained by domestic emission limits. However, in a world where economies are increasingly linked through international trade, policy changes in one country cause spillover effects to all trading partners via changes in the international prices, i.e. the terms of trade.
In this context, developing countries are concerned that abatement strategies in Annex B countries negatively affect their economic development and welfare. The developed world as a large trading block may exploit international market power and influence international prices at the expense of its trading partners in the developing world, hereby passing on some fraction of the costs of abatement ("beggar-thy-neighbor" policy). The Kyoto Protocol explicitly reflects these concerns by postulating that developed countries "...shall strive to implement policies and measures ... in such a way as to minimize adverse ... economic impacts on other Parties, especially developing countries Parties ..." (UN 1997 , Article 2, paragraph 3). On the other hand, the developed Annex B countries fear adverse changes in the terms of trade from unilateral abatement, because their energy use will be taxed, while there will be no taxes in the developing world, hence they can expect to lose competitiveness in energy-intensive goods.
In the policy debate, the issue of induced changes in terms of trade is linked to demands for adjustment mechanisms which provide more or less explicit compensation for "unfair" spillovers. The developing world is guaranteed compensation by Annex B for induced economic costs under Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC 1992). In turn, the developed world argues for compensation 1 if unilateral abatement policies provide economic gains to non-abating non-Annex B countries. This 1
Compensating measures also include proposals for border taxes on energy intensive imports and border subsidies on energy-intensive exports in order to mitigate negative shifts in comparative advantage. argument may be supported by fair division theory stating that no-one should benefit from the emission abatement burdens of others (Helm 2000) . Moulin, for example, argues that "fair division conveys the idea of no subsidization: the presence of other agents who are willing to pay higher monetary transfers than me for consuming the resources should not turn to my advantage" (Moulin 1992 (Moulin , p. 1333 .
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Of course, the debate on compensation for adverse spillovers takes place not only between the developed and the developing world, but also among countries of the respective groups (see, e.g., the bargaining process on burden sharing within the EU; Böhringer, Harrison and Rutherford 1998) .
The comprehensive policy evaluation of abatement strategies with respect to the distribution of potential costs and benefits across countries requires quantitative assessment of how economic performance in a specific country will not be only affected by its own action, but also by those of other regions. There is a need for uncovering the sign and the magnitude of multilateral spillovers from policy interference through international channels.
In this paper, we apply a generic procedure developed by Harrison, Horridge and Pearson (1999) to decompose the economic implications of the Kyoto Protocol at the cross-country level.
The total economic impact for each region is split into contributions from its own policy changes and those from other regions. Apart from qualitative insights into the sources of economic gains and losses across countries, the decomposition allows the measurement of the individual contributions of changes in exogenous policies (in our case: multilateral abatement measures) to the overall change in endogenous economic variables. In principle, were they able to agree on model structure and parameters, policy makers could use such information as a reference point for negotiating bilateral transfer payments according to some agreed equity principles.
For the implementation and application of the decomposition by Harrison, Horridge and Pearson, we use a static large-scale computable general equilibrium model of the world economy.
Our key findings can be summarized as follows:
• Emission constraints as mandated under the Kyoto Protocol induce significant spillovers from abating Annex B countries to non-abating Non-Annex B regions. Compliance with the Kyoto targets through national abatement measures imposes welfare losses for all OECD regions, 2 This contrasts to the position of some authors who explicitly argue that climate change protection strategies should be designed such that they favor developing countries (Simonis 1996). whereas developing regions with exception of large energy exporters may increase welfare due to gains in comparative advantage.
• Analyzing the individual contributions across policy measures of abating countries, action on behalf of the United States produces by far the largest spillovers to other countries. Major competitors such as Europe and Japan benefit significantly from abatement in the United States, whereas the United States, in turn, are hardly affected by abatement policies of these regions.
• Among developing countries, Brazil and India benefit from the abatement in all OECD countries, whereas the reverse is true for energy exporting developing regions.
• Although the specific quantitative values for the decomposed bilateral spillovers depend on the policy instrument (here: taxes versus permits) the qualitative results remain robust.
Translation of decomposed welfare effects into a matrix of bilateral transfer payments could therefore provide a starting point for bilateral negotiations on compensation negative international spillovers from domestic abatement policies.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a description of the decomposition technique; section 3 lays out the model framework in use for the impact analysis of Kyoto; section 4 discusses the numerical results; and section 5 concludes.
The General Equilibrium Decomposition Technique
General equilibrium provides an established micro-consistent approach for evaluating the impacts of public policy on resource allocation (efficiency) and the associated changes in income for economic agents ("equity"). It has been, and still is, widely used in analytical work for assessing policy measures, such as tax reforms, where market interactions potentially play an important role. However, for the sake of tractability, analytical approaches are typically rather simple and not sufficiently complex for applied policy analysis. Therefore, numerical models are commonly used to accommodate the systematic analysis of economic problems where analytical solutions are either not available or do not provide adequate information.
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The main virtue of complex computational general equilibrium (CGE) models, i.e. the comprehensive and consistent quantification of direct and indirect policy impacts, also constitutes 3 For surveys on the use of numerical models in different fields, see e.g. Bergmann 1990 , Kehoe and Kehoe 1994 , Shoven and Whalley 1992 , Peireira and Shoven 1992 the major challenge for their use. As various partial effects, which may work in opposite directions, contribute to the overall effect, it can get very difficult to explain in depth the aggregate policy outcome. Numerical applications inherit some ambiguity in the interpretation of the results as long as it is not possible to make transparent the sign and the magnitude of individual effects. Therefore, procedures which allow the decomposition of general equilibrium effects in a meaningful way are very helpful for the understanding and interpretation of policy simulations. A deliberate decomposition not only facilitates analysis of the various sources of the total effects, but also assures a more rigorous check for the correct numerical implementation of policy questions. 4 In the context of multilateral policy appraisal, Böhringer and Rutherford (1999) present a decomposition that splits the overall economic effect into a domestic market effect keeping international prices constant, and an international market effect as a result of changes in international prices (terms of trade effect).
5 In other words, the decomposition allows separation of the primary effect of domestic policy action from the secondary burden or benefit transmitted via changes in international prices. Yet, the procedure is not suited for quantifying how much of the total economic impact for one specific region is due to its own action and what is contributed by the individual actions of other regions. Harrison, Horridge and Pearson (1999, henceforth "HHP") propose a linear decomposition methodology for calculating the contributions of multiple exogenous policy instruments to the resulting changes in individual endogenous variables.
The HHP method may be best explained along a simplified example where an endogenous variable Z can be expressed as an explicit function of a vector X of policy instruments (exogenous variables):
In policy analysis, we consider changes in the instruments and we would like to attribute changes in the aggregate outcome ∆Z to changes in the individual policy instruments: 4 Typically, CGE models are calibrated to a benchmark data set in economic flows for given values of elasticities. The replication check of the benchmark equilibrium serves as a test for the consistent integration of data, but does not assure "proper" economics.
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The key idea is that each region of a multi-region model can be represented as a small open economy in order to separate the domestic policy effect under fixed terms of trade. The changes in international prices can then be imposed parametrically on the small open economy to yield the full policy as previously calculated in the multiregion framework.
where ∆Z i denotes the change in the endogenous variable Z due to the change in the policy instrument x i .
One possible decomposition would be a sequential approximation of the impacts of one exogenous variable while keeping all others constant (see e.g. Huff and Hertel 1997) . Assuming that F is differentiable, the contribution of a change in the exogenous variable x i which moves from the initial value x i0 to the new value x i1 can then be computed as the line integral:
For the numerical computation, the total change in the exogenous variable i x ∆ is divided into sufficiently small steps in order to approximate the line integral through linearization.
When F is nonlinear, however, the total change from shocks in exogenous variables can not be decomposed in additive line-integrals for each exogenous variable starting from the same reference (initial) value Z 0 . The impact of a change in an exogenous variable must be calculated, taking into account the contributions of previous changes in other exogenous variables. This implies that the decomposition is potentially sensitive to the sequential ordering of changes in the exogenous policy variables. As there are n! ways of sequential ordering of n exogenous variables, one quickly ends up with a large number of possible (different) decompositions for relatively small-scale policy experiments. 6 For many policy packages no decomposition might be obviously more plausible than the rest. HHP therefore suggest an order-independent "natural " way of calculating contributions. On In our policy simulation of Kyoto we assess the differential impacts of 6 emission abating countries, which yields 720 possible ways of decomposing the total effect.
0≤ t≤ 1:
uniform scaling index for all policy instruments
The local dependence of Z on t is then:
We can then write the total change in Z as:
The individual contributions are typically obtained by linear numerical approximation:
ε: differentiation perturbation.
Appendix A provides a concrete example of how the decomposition can be implemented numerically. For our analysis we use a static 8-sector, 13-region CGE model of the world economy. The choice of sectors captures key dimensions in the analysis of greenhouse gas abatement such as differences in carbon intensities and the scope for substitutability across energy goods and carbon-intensive non-energy goods. The regional aggregation covers the Annex B parties as well as major non-Annex-B regions which are central to the greenhouse gas issue. 8 Table 1 summarizes the sectors and regions incorporated in our model. 
Nontechnical Model Overview
This section provides a non-technical summary of the model. The algebraic model documentation is given in Appendix B.
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Note that the perspective on spillovers by HHP is different from Böhringer and Rutherford (1999) . In the HHP approach, the individual contributions from exogenous policy changes include both changes in domestic as well as changes in international prices, whereas Böhringer and Rutherford separate domestic from international markets.
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The aggregation is based on the GTAP-E data base which reconciles the GTAP economic production and trade dataset (Mc Dougall 1997) with OECD/IEA energy statistics (IEA 1996) for 45 regions and 23 sectors (Babiker and Rutherford 1998) . See Appendix C for the mapping of GTAP regions and sectors with respect to the definitions of Table 1. Primary factors include labor, capital and fossil-fuel resources. Labor and capital are intersectorally mobile within a region but cannot move between regions. A sector-specific resource is used in the production of primary fossil fuels (crude oil, coal and gas), resulting in upward sloping supply schedules for those goods.
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Production of commodities other than primary fossil fuels is captured by aggregate production functions which characterize technology through substitution possibilities between various inputs. Nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) cost functions with three levels are employed to specify the KLEM substitution possibilities in domestic production between capital, labor, energy and material (non-energy) intermediate inputs. At the top level, non-energy inputs are employed in fixed proportions with an aggregate of energy, capital and labor. The material input of good i in sector j corresponds to a CES Armington aggregate of non-energy inputs from domestic production and imported varieties. At the second level, a CES function describes the substitution possibilities between the energy aggregate and the aggregate of labor and capital. Finally, at the third level, capital and labor trade off with a constant elasticity of substitution. As to the formation of the energy aggregate, we allow sufficient levels of nesting to permit substitution between primary energy types as well as substitution between a primary energy composite and secondary energy, i.e. electricity.
In the production of fossil fuels, labor, capital and fossil fuel inputs are aggregated in fixed proportions at the lower nest. At the top level, this aggregate trades off with the sectorspecific fossil-fuel resource at a constant elasticity of substitution. The latter is calibrated in consistency with exogenously given price elasticities of fossil fuel supplies. This model does not account for imperfectly competitive behavior on the part of oil exporting countries.
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In the benchmark, the model includes taxes on output, intermediate inputs, exports and imports, as well as taxes on final demand. aggregation of imports and domestic commodities. The energy aggregate in final demand consists of the various energy goods trading off at a constant elasticity of substitution.
All commodities are traded internationally. Crude oil is imported and exported as a homogeneous product, subject to tariffs and export taxes. For all other commodities, we adopt the Armington assumption of product differentiation.
Baseline Calibration
The economic effects of the Kyoto Protocol depend crucially on the extent to which quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs) bind the economies in the budget period.
In other words, the magnitude and distribution of costs associated with the implementation of future emission constraints depend on the Business-as-Usual (BaU) projections for GDP, fuel prices, energy efficiency improvements, etc. In our comparative-static framework we infer the BaU structure of the model's regions for 2010 using the most recent projections on the economic development. We measure the economic effects associated with abatement measures relative to that baseline.
As a starting point for our forward projection, we use the GTAP-E database (Babiker and Rutherford 1998) which reconciles economic production and trade data (based on GTAP4 -McDougall 1997) and OECD/IEA energy statistics (IEA 1996) for 1995 -the most recent year for which a complete set of statistics is available. We use this benchmark data to calibrate parameters of the CES functional forms from a given set of quantities and prices (given exogenous elasticities). In a second step, we do the forward calibration of the 1995 economies to 2010 incorporating exogenous information by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE 1998) for GDP growth, energy demand and future energy prices. Finally, the fossil fuel production functions are calibrated so that they are consistent with exogenous price elasticities of supply.
Policy Simulations and Results
The Kyoto Protocol commits Annex B countries to the reduction of their aggregate CO 2 equivalent emissions on average by 5.2% below 1990 levels in the period from 2008 to 2012. In our simulation, we assume that Annex B countries apply domestic carbon taxes which are high enough to meet their individual Kyoto commitments. Carbon tax revenues accrue directly to the representative agent in each region. This tax policy setting is formally equivalent to a permit system where the representative agent auctions the region's Kyoto emission budget on domestic markets. The permit price then coincides with the carbon tax, both measuring the marginal costs of abatement.
Effective Reduction Requirements and Marginal Abatement Costs
It is important to notice that the effective emission constraint for Annex B countries under the Kyoto Protocol must be measured against the BaU economic activity without abatement requirements. 11 Because emissions of most Annex B countries grow significantly along the baseline as compared to 1990 levels, the Kyoto targets which are stated with respect to 1990 as the base year translate into much higher effective carbon requirements with respect to BaU emission levels in 2010. For example, OOE is allowed to increase emissions under the Kyoto Protocol by 7% over 1990 levels, while it faces effectively the need for a decrease by more than 15% from BaU emissions in 2010. The one outlier is FSU whose projected emission levels for 2010 are below 1990 levels due to economic recession and industrial restructuring between 1990
and 2000. Table 3 reports the effective percentage cutbacks joint with the marginal abatement costs across Annex B countries. The level of abatement is a major determinant of the marginal abatement costs. The further out we are on the abatement cost curve, the more costly it is at the margin to substitute away from carbon in production and consumption. Obviously, the marginal 11 See Böhringer, Jensen and Rutherford (2000) for the implications of alternative baseline projections on the magnitude and distribution of emission abatement costs. abatement costs for FSU are zero because its economic development will not be constrained by the Kyoto commitment. CEA faces a rather weak reduction requirement of only 2.2 % with respect to BaU emissions in 2010, which explains the moderate carbon tax of 6 $US per ton of carbon. As we move towards higher reduction targets the emission taxes increase significantly ranging up to 210 $US per ton of carbon for Japan. Comparison of tax rates and reduction requirements across countries indicates that the relative cutback requirements are only one determinant of marginal abatement costs. The latter depend also on the BaU energy price levels. For constant-elasticity demand relationships, where changes in demand are directly proportional to the relative change in prices, a country with higher BaU energy prices will require larger carbon taxes to achieve the same percentage emission reduction than countries with lower BaU energy prices.
12 Differences in carbon intensities of sectors across countries also play an important role for explaining the variation in marginal abatement costs. Countries which heavily use coal in sectors where inter-fuel substitution comes relatively cheap (e. g. the electricity sector) require smaller carbon taxes to meet the same reduction as compared to countries which use relatively little carbon in sectors with low-cost substitution options. These relationships explain why ,for example, JPN faces much higher carbon taxes compared to USA or CAN, although its percentage reduction target is smaller: BaU energy prices in JPN are considerably higher than in USA and CAN. In addition, JPN has little scope for cheap inter-fuel substitution in electricity generation which is largely nuclear-power based. As a consequence, JPN has to cut back on relatively more emissions in other sectors such as traffic where abatement comes more costly at the margin. Abstracting from environmental benefits and substantial initial tax distortions which might raise the scope for a double dividend from environmental taxation (see e.g. Goulder 1995), the costs of Kyoto are straightforward at the global level (see last row of Table 4 ). Adjustment of production and consumption patterns towards less carbon intensity implies a less productive use of resources which translates into a decline of real income, i. e. less consumption given fixed investment. However, at the single-country level the welfare implications are ambiguous. The reason for this are international spillovers which might dominate the unambiguous primary domestic policy effect. 13 In Table 4 we see that for all OECD countries (USA, CAN, EUR, JPN, OOE) the primary costs of domestic abatement dominates potentially offsetting changes in the terms of trade (ToT) which is not surprising given the magnitude of the carbon taxes imposed. On
Total Welfare Costs

12
The simple reason is that the higher the BaU energy prices, the larger the required absolute increase in prices to achieve a given percentage change in prices.
13
Carbon emission constraints induce substitution of fossil fuels with more expensive energy sources (fuel switching) or employment of more expensive manufacturing and production techniques (energy savings). On the consumption side, higher energy prices imply a change in the consumption mix which results in a loss of welfare (consumer surplus). the other hand, CEA experiences a significant increase in welfare despite the application of a domestic carbon tax. Because the latter is very small, secondary ToT gains more than offset the small domestic abatement costs. Among Annex B countries, FSU, which does not have to impose any domestic carbon tax, faces a welfare losses through the deterioration of its ToT.
Abatement policies by Annex B regions not only mutually affect their welfare but also produce substantial spillovers to non-Annex-B regions. For the latter (as well as for FSU), the welfare implications of international market interactions are fully reflected by the numbers in Table 4 . We see that, apart from MPC and ROW, all non-Annex-B countries gain a comparative advantage, i. e. improve their terms of trade.
For any particular region, the terms-of-trade effect is determined by the composition of a substitution effect and a scale effect. For example, non-abating countries might gain export shares for energy-intensive goods from abating countries; however, this might be (partially) offset by a reduction in the scale of exports to abating countries as final demand in those countries shrinks with the increase in consumer goods prices. Changes in international fuel prices play a major role for the aggregate terms-of-trade effects with opposite implications for energy importers and energy exporters. The substantial cut in energy demand by the industrialized world 14 leads to a drop in producer prices for fossil fuels. Among fossil energy goods, the decline in prices is most pronounced for carbon-intensive coal, followed by less carbon-intensive (crude) oil and natural gas. All developing countries, except for MPC and ROW, are net importers of fossil energies and benefit from the fall in international energy prices. MPC and ROW are net exporters of fossil energies and face a loss of revenues from energy sales. With respect to trade in energy-intensive goods, developing countries gain a comparative advantage as compared to OECD countries with high energy prices. However, for MPC and ROW, this benefit is not large enough to offset the adverse effect on fossil fuel markets. Like MPC, FSU as a large energy exporter of oil and gas, suffers from the decrease in fuel prices. Among abating countries, CEA not only improves welfare due to lower energy import prices for natural gas and crude oil but also gains international competitiveness in energy-intensive production as compared to other abating countries due to its much low carbon taxes.
14 The expansion in energy use by some non-abating countries is by far too small in order to offset the reduced demand by Annex B countries.
Decomposition of Total Welfare Impact
Whereas Table 4 conveys information on the magnitude and distribution of costs and gains from Kyoto for individual regions, it does not reveal how the total welfare changes can be attributed to the individual abatement policies across Annex B countries. The latter is potentially important for the global policy debate on greenhouse gas emission abatement when it comes to the delicate issue of compensation for international spillovers from domestic policies. Application of the HHP decomposition with respect to abatement policies in Annex B countries delivers this information.
The results, presented in Table 5 , show the percentage of the welfare cost for each region (rows) attributable to carbon taxes in each of the Annex B regions (columns). These numbers are obtained along a line integral in which we change the carbon taxes across abating regions at equal rates starting from zero and ending with the final carbon taxes as reported in Table 3 . A negative sign indicates that the effect of the abatement policy by the column region is opposite to the change in total welfare of the row region. For example, a positive row entry for CAN, which faces an aggregate welfare loss, means that action of the respective column region induces a welfare loss. On the other hand, a positive row entry for CEA, which in total benefits from the implementation of the Kyoto targets, indicates that action of the respective column region produces positive welfare spillovers.
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Note that there is no column for Annex B country FSU, simply because FSU does not have to undertake any domestic action in order to meet its Kyoto commitment.
The diagonal elements for abating regions reveal the percentage of their aggregate welfare changes due to their own policy. We see that the own-policy effect dominates the aggregate of the foreign-policy effects, except for CEA and OOE, which impose rather small domestic carbon taxes. In addition, we can already infer from the diagonal elements that CEA, EUR and JPN benefit substantially from abatement in other Annex B regions, whereas OOE is significantly worse off.
Reading Table 5 by columns, it follows that action by the USA produces by far the largest spillovers to other countries. The main source for these spillovers are adjustments on the international fossil fuel markets which are predominantly induced by the substantial cut-backs in US fossil energy demand. Abatement on behalf of the USA accounts for the bigger part of the decline in producer prices for fossil fuels following implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. This produces positive bilateral spillovers to large fuel importers such as EUR, JPN and several developing regions (ASI, BRA, CHN, IND) whereas fuel exporters such as CAN, MPC or ROW are negatively affected. At the other end of the impact spectrum, we find OOE and CEA whose spillovers to other regions are rather negligible due to their moderate tax rates joint with those countries' small shares in overall trade volumes.
Reading Table 5 by rows, we obtain information on how a country is affected by the carbon taxes of abating Annex B parties. International spillovers play an inferior role for USA and CAN. CAN is only sensitive to carbon taxes in the USA which produce welfare-decreasing feed-backs to the Canadian economy. The reasons are twofold. First, CAN as a fossil fuel exporter suffers from the drop in fuel prices induced by US carbon taxes. Second, abatement in USA which is Canada's most important trading partner slows down the US economic activity and induces a fall in aggregate important demand for CAN. Carbon taxes in EUR, JPN and OOE improve the competitiveness of USA relative to their OECD partners, however, the quantitative impact is rather small. Inversely, EUR and JPN benefit substantially from action in the USA whereas OOE faces non-negligible welfare losses. The non-reciprocal impacts across OECD countries confirm the important role of spillovers from fossil fuel markets which are to a large extent driven by the abatement action of the USA: EUR and JPN benefit from the decline in fossil fuel prices whereas OOE as a large coal exporter suffers particularly from the drop in Abatement in all other countries, however, provide terms-of-trade gains for ASI and CHN.
We can translate the percentage changes in welfare from individual policy action as reported in Table 5 into monetary units. The resulting Table 6 could then be interpreted as a cross-country matrix for transfer payments which have to be assigned on a bilateral basis in order to provide compensation for the Kyoto impacts. In our exposition of compensating transfers, we net out payments between abating countries so that we can derive net transfers in present value terms. A positive entry indicates compensation claims of the row region towards the column region. For example, USA should compensate the OPEC countries plus Mexico (MPC) with roughly 0.7 billion dollars annually to offset the adverse impact of its abatement policy on that region. Likewise, Europe must transfer nearly the same amount to the USA to make up for the benefits EUR experiences from USA action.
Despite the apparent tidiness of this calculation, there remain substantial uncertainty regarding the estimated values. One key uncertainty concerns the decomposition procedure itself, because, as we will see below, the decomposition proposed by Harrison, Horridge and Pearson does not resolve all ambiguities.
Complementary to the decomposition of the total welfare effect using a price instrument (emission taxes), we could just as easily perform the decomposition using a quantity instrument (emission permits). For the latter, we reduce the emission budgets of abating countries in equal proportions, starting from BaU emission levels towards the emission quantities as imposed by the Kyoto Protocol. The quantity instrument produces exactly the same aggregate changes in endogenous variables as the price instrument procedure does. However, as indicated by comparing Tables 5 and 7 (or likewise Tables 6 and 8) , there are differences in the quantitative estimates for the contributions by individual policy measures. The reason is that the two procedures for approximation of the line integrals of individual policy changes follow a different path although the outcomes are the same. Obviously, the decomposition approach proposed by HHP does not resolve all ambiguities. In our policy application, even though the qualitative results are largely the same, there are non-negligible difference in the magnitudes of welfare changes and associated potential transfer payments. We therefore conclude that while the HHP decomposition procedure is insightful, it does not provide an unambiguous estimate of bilateral transfer payments which would compensate for spillovers from Annex B action. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we evaluated the welfare implications of the Kyoto Protocol for the world economy. We used a new decomposition procedure developed by Harrison, Horridge and Pearson to investigate the sources of welfare changes across regions induced by greenhouse gas emission constraints. The decomposition delivers quantitative estimates on how the total welfare changes can be attributed to the individual abatement policies across Annex B countries. This information is potentially important for the burden sharing debate in climate protection policies as it provides a starting point for bilateral negotiations on transfer payments across parties of the Framework Convention.
From a methodological point of view, the decomposition technique is a very helpful tool for diagnosing the channels through which international trade and asset markets transmit policy impacts between countries. In our application we have shown that the decomposition does not resolve all ambiguities, because specific quantitative values for the decomposed bilateral spillovers depend on the choice of the policy instrument. When we simply change from a price instrument (taxes) to a quantity instrument (emissions) in order to meet the Kyoto commitments, the quantitative decomposition results change. However, our qualitative insights as well as the order of magnitude for the quantitative estimates remain robust.
An important caveat with respect to the concrete model formulation adopted for our policy simulations concerns the representation of intertemporal issues. In the absence of an endogenous response of capital to changes in rates of return, our static model may fail to account for some important mechanisms through which carbon emission constraints affect the global economy. We leave to future work the application of the decomposition methodology illustrated here to a model with forward-looking agents and endogenous capital stocks.
Appendix A: Numerical Implementation of the Decomposition Procedure
We illustrate the numerical implementation of the HHP decomposition along a simple multiregion exchange model. In each region a representative consumer is endowed with a macro-good which either can be either domestically used or exported. Domestic consumption is captured by a constant-elasticity-of-substitution ( We add the names of the corresponding equations in the model source code within parenthesis.
The competitive equilibrium for this small exchange equilibrium is characterized by the above zero-profit conditions and market clearance conditions. In equilibrium, each zero-profit condition is linked to a activity level, and each market clearance condition is linked to a price level.
Below, we provide the source code for our maquette written in GAMS (Brooke, Kendrick and Meeraus 1998) . We start from a base year (benchmark) equilibrium where no tariffs apply. In the policy counterfactual each region levies a uniform import tariff of 10 %. The decomposition subroutine delivers the information how the total welfare change for each region (measured in terms of real consumption) can be attributed to the changes in policy instruments (here: tariffs) across regions. Step size in integral over t; *
Step size for the line integral: dt = 1 /(card(t)-1); * Define a reasonable value for numerical differencing: epsilon = 0.0001; tm0(r) = 0; deltatm(r) = 0.1; tm(r) = tm0(r); loop(t, solve exchange using mcp; w0(r,t) = c.l(r); loop(s, tm(s) = tm(s) + epsilon; solve exchange using mcp; dwdtm(r,t,s) = (c.l(r) -w0(r,t)) / epsilon; tm(s) = tm(s) -epsilon; ); tm(r) = tm(r) + dt * deltatm(r); ); decomp(r,rr) = sum(t, dwdtm(r,t,rr) * deltatm(rr) * dt); handshake(r) = sum(rr, decomp(r,rr)) -sum(t$(ord(t) gt 1), w0(r,t) -w0(r,t-1)); pctdecomp(r,rr) = round( 100 * decomp(r,rr) / sum(s, decomp(r,s))); option pctdecomp:0; display decomp, handshake, pctdecomp; d=I: investment demand). The label EG represents the set of energy goods and the label FF denotes the subset of fossil fuels. Tables A.1 -A.6 explain the notations for variables and parameters employed within our algebraic exposition.
A.1 Zero Profit Conditions
1. Production of goods except fossil fuels:
2. Production of fossil fuels: 
5. Aggregate imports across import regions:
6. Household consumption demand: 
Good markets:
p M p A = p Y ir M
